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| Monday, 24 July 2006 | |||
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The UK, like all responsible countries, promotes global security through strategic export controls. This article seeks to give a flavour of the important issues that form the basis of export control policy with regard to the nuclear industry and explain the licensing process.
The UK, like all responsible countries, promotes global security through strategic export controls. This article seeks to give a flavour of the important issues that form the basis of export control policy with regard to the nuclear industry and explain the licensing process. International treaties and regimes relating to the nuclear industry To comply with the NPT provisions, a number of nuclear suppliers - including the UK - coordinate their nuclear supply policies within the framework of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Zangger Committee was specifically charged with interpreting the obligations set out in Article III (2) of the NPT in relation to the most sensitive nuclear items. It was responsible for drawing up a detailed list of goods, the so called Trigger List, which the Treaty required states to control. The NSG is a non-proliferation regime set up following international concerns that conditions of nuclear supply needed strengthening - largely as a result of the 1974 Indian nuclear test - to better meet nuclear non-proliferation. NSG member states drew up a set of guidelines for handling nuclear exports to reduce the possibility that such exports are diverted to nuclear explosive or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities. The aim here is to ensure that international trade in such goods, technology or software for use for peaceful purposes, does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1992 the NSG produced separate guidelines to cover nuclear related dual use goods, eg machine tools, which are not designed for nuclear use but could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapon components or components for gas centrifuges. The NSG Dual Use list also controls high explosives and initiators, which could be used for the explosive assembly (implosion) of fissile material within a nuclear warhead.
The non-proliferation regimes agree internationally which items are of strategic concern and should therefore be subject to export control on the military and dual use control lists. In addition to control list items, for which export licences are required in all circumstances, WMD end use controls, or 'catch-all' provisions, potentially apply to the export or transfer of any non-controlled goods, software and technology which have a 'relevant use' in connection with WMD. The end-use control can be applied to any goods, be they main equipment or components, with potential use in connection with a WMD programme. In practice however, goods which are clearly general purpose (pens or pencils as extreme examples for instance) would not be made subject to the control. In considering whether to apply the control and then grant or refuse a licence, HMG will assess the utility of the goods in the context of the known state of the relevant WMD programme, together with any relevant intelligence about the specific use to which that particular export might be put. The Export Control Act 2002 The act has strengthened and modernised the UK's strategic export control regime to reflect the way business is conducted today and to enable the UK to meet its international obligations. Of particular interest to the nuclear industry are the controls introduced on the transfer of technology by any means and the provision of technical assistance where the transferor knows or has been made aware by the DTI that such technology or technical assistance may be for use in connection with a relevant WMD use outside the EU. New controls have also been introduced on trafficking and brokering in military goods. The licensing process There are a number of Open General Export Licences (OGELs) published on the ECO website. If a suitable OGEL is not available, the exporter must apply to the ECO for a Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) or Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL). Specific conditions apply to open licences and compliance with these conditions is checked regularly by ECO Compliance Officers. More information on the types of licences available to exporters and how to apply is available from the ECO website. The ECO has also recently produced a DVD which contains an overview of the UK controls, as well as a number of modules containing detailed information on specific subject areas such as open licensing, the new Export Control Act, and the end use controls. In assessing SIEL and OIEL applications, the ECO will initially assess the goods against current legislation to verify that a licence is in fact required. The application is then circulated to other government departments, in most cases the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for assessment against the EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. A copy of the criteria can be obtained from FCO website. Applications may also be sent to other advisers depending on the items being exported or their ultimate destination, eg, the DTI's Non-Proliferation Directorate (XNP2), which advises on whether the proposed export or transfer is consistent with the UK's commitments under the non-proliferation regimes. If any of these advisers recommend refusal of a licence application, it is reviewed by an inter-Departmental Committee and considered in detail against the consolidated criteria to determine whether refusal is justified. Only a very small proportion of licence applications - roughly three per cent - are refused, but an automatic right of appeal exists. In submitting an appeal, the applicant must include any new information or arguments, which were not available at the time of the original application. David Whitehouse, Head of the Casework Licensing Unit, DTI Export Control Organisation Contact details and further information
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